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Abstract. The title of this paper suggests two distinct aspects of the
models that we propose and consider. The rst of these is the mod-
elling of other agents by motivated agents. That is to say that the act
of modelling is itself motivated and constrained by the agent doing that
modelling. The second aspect is that all such models will also be of mo-
tivated agents. It is not sucient merely to know what other agents are
like, but also to know why they are like that. This why aspect is what
provides the extra information that allows a greater understanding of the
interactions between entities in the world, and consequently provides for
more resilient agents capable of eectively dealing with new and unfore-
seen circumstances in an uncertain world. Previous work has described a
formal framework for agency and autonomy in which agents are viewed as
objects with goals, and autonomous agents are agents with motivations.
This paper considers the nature of cooperation within that framework.
We identify distinct kinds of interaction, depending on the nature of the
entities involved. In particular, we describe and specify the dierences
that arise in these interactions which we characterise as engagements of
non-autonomous agents, and cooperation between autonomous agents.
1 Introduction
Recent work in articial intelligence has begun to investigate many aspects of
single-agent and multi-agent systems. One reason for the concentration of eort
into agent-oriented work is that much previous research was concerned with
toy problems unrelated to the embodiment of the problem-solver, or whether it
was situated in a real external environment. Thus, though signicant advances
have been made through such work, these have been limited since many of the
solutions developed will not adapt well to more realistic scenarios. The relatively
recent recognition of these limitations has been a key motivating factor in the
research and development of agents as systems capable of intelligent behaviour
in a resilient and exible way.
The rapid growth of the eld, however, has led to diverse notions of agents and
autonomous agents, which are only now, at least partly, becoming reconciled[14].
Our work seeks to contribute to that reconciliation by providing formal but
accessible models of agents and autonomous agents, and their interactions.
In previous work, we have proposed denitions of agency and autonomy, and
described how autonomy is distinct but is achieved by motivating agency [6]
and generating goals [7]. This paper considers aspects of agent modelling within
that framework, and describes how the framework provides useful structure that
can be exploited by intelligent agents for more eective operation. We begin
by outlining previous work on the agent hierarchy. Then we consider the types
of interactions that occur in the world, distinguishing in particular between
engagements of non-autonomous agents and cooperation between autonomous
agents. We end by illustrating how these relationships structure the information
that is available to an agent enabling a more appropriate use of resources.
2 A Framework for Agency and Autonomy
In essence, our framework is a three-tiered hierarchy of entities comprising ob-
jects, agents and autonomous agents. In this hierarchy, all known entities are
objects of which some are agents, and of these agents, some are autonomous
agents. This is shown as a Venn diagram in Figure 1. Note the addition of some
extra categories to be used later in this paper. The central set covers autonomous
agents, the ring enclosing it covers non-autonomous or server-agents (SAgents
in the diagram), and the outer ring covers non-agent objects or neutral-objects
(NObjects). This section briey outlines the agent hierarchy. Many details are
omitted, and a more complete treatment can be found in [6].
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Fig. 1. The Entity Hierarchy
An object is just something with abilities and attributes. For example, the
attributes of a table specify that it is stable, wooden, brown and has a at
surface, while its capabilities specify that it can support things. Another well-
used example is a robot without a power supply whose capabilities are limited
and include just those which rely on its physical presence, such as supporting
things, weighing things down, and so on. Its attributes specify that it is blue,
that it is upright, that it is large, and so on.
An agent is an object that is (typically) useful to another agent where this
usefulness is dened in terms of satisfying that agent's goals. In other words, an
agent is an object with an associated set of goals. For example, if I support my
computer on a table, then the table is my agent for supporting the computer.
The table may not actually possess the goal, but is certainly satisfying it. A
particular object may produce dierent instantiations of agents which are created
in response to another agent. Agency is thus transient, and objects may become
agents at some times, while those agents may revert to objects at other times.
For example, if the robot of the earlier example now has a power supply,
there are two possibilities. In the rst case, the robot does not have a goal and
can therefore use its actuators only in a random way, and must be considered an
object. In the second case, the robot does have a goal, and this allows it to use
its actuators in a directed way, such as riveting a panel onto a hull. This means
that it is an agent. The goal need not be explicit, but can instead be implicit in
the robot's design.
In this sense, an agent can be benevolent. If a robot is designed simply
to accept requests to pick up panels and rivet them onto a hull without any
evaluation of the request, then it is benevolent. Moreover it is an agent for the
requesting agent. This is important, for by modelling the relationship of one
agent satisfying the goal of another, we can infer much about the situation. For
example, if I want the robot to be my agent and satisfy my goals by riveting
particular panels for me, then I may have to negotiate with the agent whose goals
are currently being satised by the robot. Thus agency indicates a relationship
between two or more parties, providing useful information about the possibility
of interacting with them. (The special case of autonomous agency is considered
next.)
This notion of agency relies upon the existence of other agents which pro-
vide goals that are adopted in order to instantiate an agent. We must therefore
have some agents which can generate their own goals so that there is not an
innite regress in adopting goals. It is these goal-generating agents which are
autonomous, since they do not depend on the goals of others, but instead pos-
sess goals which are generated from internal motivations which characterise the
agent. Motivations are related to goals, but are qualitatively dierent in that
they are not describable states of aairs in the environment. The motivation
greed, for example, does not specify a state of aairs to be achieved, but may
give rise to the generation of a goal to rob a bank. The motivation provides a
reason for achieving the goal which species what to do.
In psychology, Kunda [5] informally denes motivation to be, \Any wish,
desire, or preference that concerns the outcome of a given reasoning task," and
suggests that motivation aects reasoning in a variety of ways including the ac-
cessing, constructing and evaluating of beliefs and evidence, and decision making.
An autonomous agent is an agent with motivations and some means of evalu-
ating behaviour in terms of the environment and those motivations, so that its
behaviour is determined by both external and internal factors. An autonomous
agent must be a motivated agent.
Our example robot will be autonomous if it has an internal mechanism for
goal generation. For example, with motivations of achievement, hunger and self-
preservation, where achievement is dened in terms of riveting panels, hunger
in terms of maintaining power levels, and self-preservation in terms of avoiding
system breakdowns, the robot will normally generate goals to rivet panels. With
low power levels, however, it may instead generate a new goal to recharge its
batteries. Alternatively, if it works for too long and is in danger of overheating,
it may generate a goal of pausing to avoid damage to its components. In the
view described above, the robot is autonomous because its goals are internally
generated through motivations in response to its environment.
To present a mathematical description of our denitions, we use the speci-
cation language, Z [13], which is increasingly being used in the AI community
[4]. However, we are sometimes loose with the syntax when detailing sequences
and sets, for example, for the purposes of concision and explication.
An entity comprises a set of motivations, a set of goals, a set of actions, and
a set of features or attributes of the entity.
Entity
attributes : Attribute
capableof : Action
goals : Goal
motivations : Motivation
attributes 6= fg
Object
Entity
capableof 6= f g
Agent
Object
goals 6= fg
AutonomousAgent
Agent
motivations 6= fg
An object, described by its features and capabilities, is just an automaton and
cannot engage other entities to perform tasks, nor is it itself used in this way.
However, it serves as a useful abstraction mechanism by which it is regarded
as distinct from the remainder of the environment, and can subsequently be
transformed into an agent, an augmented object, engaged to perform some task
or satisfy some goal. Viewing something as an agent means that we regard it as
satisfying or pursuing some goal. Furthermore, it means that it must be doing
so either for another agent, or for itself, in which case it is autonomous. If it is
for itself, it must have generated the goal through its motivations.
For the purposes of the following sections in which we discuss the kinds of
relationship that can be modelled, we further rene the agent hierarchy through
the introduction of two new terms. A neutral-object is an object that is not an
agent, and a server-agent is an agent that is not an autonomous agent.
NeutralObject
Object
goals = f g ^ motivations = fg
ServerAgent
Agent
motivations = f g
Wemust consider the multi-agentworld as a whole rather than just individual
agents. This world is dened below, where all autonomous agents are agents, all
agents are objects and all objects are entities. An agent is either a server-agent
or an autonomous agent, and an object is either a neutral-object or an agent.
World
entities : Entity
objects : Object
agents : Agent
autonomousagents : AutonomousAgent
neutralobjects : NeutralObject
serveragents :  ServerAgent
autonomousagents  agents  objects  entities
agents = autonomousagents [ serveragents
objects = neutralobjects [ agents
3 Engagement and Cooperation
Much existing work has dened cooperation only in terms of helpful agents that
are predisposed to adopt the goals of another (e.g.[12, 2]). This assumes that
agents are already designed with common or non-conicting goals that facilitate
the possibility of helping each other satisfy additional goals. Our view diers in
that autonomous agents will only adopt a goal if it is to their advantage to do
so, while non-autonomous agents may benevolently adopt goals. This leads to
the distinction between cooperation and engagement as discussed below.
3.1 Engagement
A direct engagement occurs when a neutral-object or a server-agent adopts some
goals. In a direct engagement, an agent with some goals, which we call the client,
uses another agent, which we call the server, to assist them in the achievement of
those goals. Remember that a server-agent is non-autonomous, and either exists
already as a result of some other engagement, or is instantiated from a neutral-
object for the current engagement. No restriction is placed on a client-agent.
We dene a direct engagement to consist of a client agent, client , a server
agent, server , and the goal that server is satisfying for client . An agent cannot
engage itself, and both agents must have the goal of the engagement.
DirectEngagement
client : Agent
server : ServerAgent
goal : Goal
client 6= server
goal 2 (client :goals \ server :goals)
The set of all direct engagements in the world is given by dengagement .
For any direct engagement in dengagement , there can be no intermediate direct
engagements of the goal, so there is no other agent, y , where client engages y for
goal , and y engages server for goal . An agent, c, directly engages another server-
agent, s, if, and only if, there is a direct engagement between c and s. All of these
relationships are given as a set denoted by dengages. Finally, the server-agents
comprise all agents which are the server agent for some direct engagement and
the agents are a superset of those agents which are part of some engagement.
WorldEngagements
World
dengagement : DirectEngagement
dengages : Agent# ServerAgent
8 eng : dengagement  : (9 y : Agent ; e
1
; e
2
: dengagement j
e
1
:goal = e
2
:goal = eng:goal  e
1
:server = eng:server ^
e
2
:client = eng:client ^ e
1
:client = e
2
:server = y)
dengages = fe : dengagement  (e:client ;e:server)g
serveragents = fd : dengagement  d :serverg
fd : dengagement  d :serverg [ fd : dengagement  d :clientg agents
An engagement chain represents a sequence of direct engagements. For exam-
ple, if I use a computer terminal to run a program to access a database in order
to locate a library book, then there is a direct engagement of myself and the ter-
minal, of the terminal and the program, and of the program and the database,
all with the goal of locating the book. An engagement chain thus represents the
goal and all the agents involved in the sequence of direct engagements. In the
above example, the agents are: Me;Terminal ;Program;Database
Specically, an engagement chain comprises some goal, goal , the autonomous
client-agent that generated the goal, autoagent , and a sequence of server-agents,
chain, where each agent in the sequence directly engages the next. For any
engagement chain, there must be at least one server-agent, all the agents involved
must share goal , and each agent can only be involved once.
EngagementChain
goal : Goal
autoagent : AutonomousAgent
chain : seq
1
Agent
goal 2 autoagent:goals
goal 2
S
fs : Agent j s 2 ran chain  s:goalsg
#(ran chain) = #chain
The set of all engagement chains in the world is given in the schema below
by engchain. For every engagement chain, ec, there must be a direct engage-
ment between the autonomous agent, ec:autoagent , and the rst client, of ec,
head ec:chain, with respect to the goal of ec, ec:goal . Further, there must be a
direct engagement between any two agents which follow each other in ec:chain
with respect to ec:goal . In addition, all the autonomous agents involved in an
engagement chain are a subset of all the autonomous agents.
WorldEngagementChains
WorldEngagements
engchain : EngagementChain
8 ec : engchain; s
1
; s
2
: Agent 
(9 d : dengagement  d :goal = ec:goal ^ d :client = ec:autoagent
^ d :server = head ec:chain) ^
hs
1
; s
2
i in ec:chain) (9d : dengagement 
d :client = s
1
^ d :server = s
2
^ d :goal = ec:goal)
fec : engchain  ec:autoagentg  autonomousagents
Now, in order to additionally specify some other relations between agents, we
will make use of the generic relation follows, dened below. This holds between
a pair of elements and a sequence of elements if the rst element of the pair
precedes the second element in the sequence.
[X ]
follows : (X X )# seqX
8 a; b : X ; s : seqX  ((a; b); s) 2 follows ,
(9 t ;u; v : seqX  s = t  hai u  hbi  v)
In general, an agent engages another agent if there is some engagement chain
in which it precedes the server agent. An agent owns another agent, if there is
no other agent using it for a dierent purpose. In other words, c owns s if, for
every sequence of server-agents in an engagement chain in which s appears, c
precedes it or is the autonomous client-agent that initiates the chain. Lastly, an
agent c directly owns another agent s, if it owns it, and is directly engaging it.
AgentRelations
WorldEngagementChains
engages;owns;downs : Agent# ServerAgent
owns : Agent# ServerAgent
downs : Agent# ServerAgent
engages = fec : engchain  (ec:autoagent;head ec:chain)g[
fec : engchain; c; s : Agent j ((c; s); ec:chain) 2 follows  (c; s)g
8 c : Agent ; s : Agent  (c; s) 2 owns , (8 ec : engchain j s 2 ran ec:chain 
ec:autoagent = c _ ((c; s); ec:chain) 2 follows)
8 c : Agent ; s : Agent  (c; s) 2 downs , (c; s) 2 owns \ dengages
3.2 Cooperation
Two autonomous agents are said to be cooperating with respect to some goal
if one of the agents has adopted goals of the other. This notion of autonomous
goal acquisition applies both to the origination of goals by an autonomous agent
for its own purposes, and the adoption of goals from others, since in each case
the goal must have a positive motivational eect [7]. For autonomous agents,
the goal of another can only be adopted if it has such an eect, and this is also
exactly why and how goals are originated. Thus goal adoption and origination
are related forms of goal generation.
That is to say that the term cooperation can be used only when those in-
volved are autonomous and, at least potentially, capable of resisting. If they are
not autonomous, nor capable of resisting, then one simply engages the other.
The dierence between engagement and cooperation is in the autonomy or non-
autonomy of the entities involved. It is senseless, for example, to consider a
terminal cooperating with its user, but meaningful to consider the user engag-
ing the terminal. Similarly, while it is not inconceivable for a user to engage a
secretary, it makes better sense to say that the user and the secretary are coop-
erating, since the secretary can withdraw assistance at any point. This applies
at the level of the denitions in the model, and in real situations. Cooperation
is thus a symmetric relation between two autonomous agents. Engagement, by
contrast, is asymmetric between a server-agent and another client agent.
A cooperation describes a goal, the autonomous agent that generated the goal,
and those autonomous agents who have adopted that goal from the generating
agent. Thus in this view, cooperation cannot occur unwittingly between agents,
but must arise as a result of the motivations of both of the individuals involved.
Cooperation
goal : Goal
generatingagent : AutonomousAgent
cooperatingagents : AutonomousAgent
#cooperatingagents  1
8 aa : cooperatingagents  goal 2 aa:goals
goal 2 generatingagent:goals
The set of all cooperations in the world is given by cooperations. Further, we
say that agent x
1
cooperateswith agent x
2
if and only if x
1
and x
2
are autonomous,
there is some cooperation in which either x
1
or x
2
is the agent that generated
the goal, and x
2
or x
1
respectively is one of the cooperating agents. The set
of all such relationships is given below by cooperates. We assert also that the
relationship is symmetric | it is equal to its own inverse | since if agent x
1
is
cooperating with x
2
then, necessarily, x
2
is cooperating with x
1
. Thus order in
cooperation is not relevant.
WorldCooperations
World
cooperations : Cooperation
cooperates : AutonomousAgent# AutonomousAgent
cooperates =
S
fa1;a2 : AutonomousAgent j
(9 c : cooperations  a1 = c:generatingagent ^
a2 2 c:cooperatingagents)  f(a1;a2); (a2;a1)gg
cooperates

= cooperates
4 Agent Models
The framework described above provides useful structure that can be exploited
by intelligent agents for more eective operation. However, this is only possible if
each agent maintains a model of their view of the world. Specically, each agent
must maintain information about the dierent entities in the environment, so
that both existing and potential relationships between those entities may be
understood and consequently manipulated as appropriate.
For example, objects are not involved in any relationship with agents. If they
were serving some useful purpose at a particular point in time, then they would
be viewed as agents. The view of an entity as an agent thus indicates that it is
engaged by another agent, either directly or back through a chain of intermediate
agents, grounded with an autonomous agent at the head of the chain. Knowledge
of the agency of an entity allows us to reason about its function and the agent
or agents that are engaging it. Thus, I understand that my colleague's pencil
is her agent for writing, and that if I want to use it I must negotiate with her
as the engaging agent. Alternatively, if one robot is assisting another to move
a crate of books, my models of the two robots may provide information as to
the direction of the relationship. That is to say that if I have a model of one as
an agent and another as an autonomous agent then, subject to circumstances,
it may be sensible for me to infer that the non-autonomous agent is engaged by
the autonomous agent. In this case, I must negotiate with the autonomous robot
if I want either of the two agents to help me in my eorts to achieve my own
goals.
In this example, this agency information provides useful structure which al-
lows us to consider issues such as whether it is possible to negotiate with another,
if such negotiation would be likely to achieve the desired result, how the negoti-
ation might be approached, and so on.
Returning to the example of the pencil above, we can see how the richness
of the situation can be captured through agent models. If my colleague is using
her pencil, then I can view it as an agent satisfying the goal of writing some
notes, for example, for its engaging agent, my colleague. Now, if I want to use
her pencil, I can reason about the situation by considering the goal that the
pencil is satisfying. First, I know that the goal was generated by my colleague,
and I must therefore negotiate with her to secure use of the pencil. However,
my knowledge of her motivations that generated the goal may lead me to decide
that I will not succeed in securing use of the pencil for any number of reasons. If
I know that the goal was generated because of an imminent important deadline,
then I may decide that I will not be successful. Alternatively, if I know that the
motivation for using the pencil was weak, then I may rate my chances of success
highly.
It is important to note that the word, \pencil", of this example might just
as easily be replaced by the word, \robot". The relationships described here are
exactly the same.
4.1 Motivation
The key to the previously dened relations is motivation. Motivation is the
`force' that causes engagement chains to built up, satisfying goals that mitigate
the motivation. In attempting to understand the nature of the relationships
between entities in the world, and using or augmenting them, it is therefore
necessary to be able to assess the relative strengths of motivation that caused
those engagements. Similarly for cooperation, though here motivation plays an
even greater role, since cooperation is symmetric and requires an assessment of
motivation in all cooperating entities. In this paper, we are concerned not with
investigating motivation, but in using it to describe engagement and cooperation.
Related work has explored the nature of motivation and similar concerns in more
detail [11, 9, 8], and we will only provide a simplied model here.
In order to retrieve goals to mitigate motivations, an autonomous agent
must have some way of assessing the eects of competing or alternative goals.
Clearly, the goals which make the greatest positive contribution to the motiva-
tions of the agent should be selected. The AssessGoals schema below describes
how an autonomous agent monitors its motivations for goal generation. First,
the AutonomousAgent schema is included, and a new variable representing the
repository of available known goals, goalbase is declared. Then, the motivational
eect on an autonomous agent of satisfying a set of new goals is given. The
motiveect function returns a numeric value representing the motivational eect
of satisfying a set of goals with a particular conguration of motivations and a
set of existing goals. The predicate part species all goals currently being pur-
sued must be known goals that already exist in the goalbase. Finally, for ease
of expression, we dene a function related to motiveect called satisfy which
returns the motivational eect of an agent satisfying some goals.
AssessGoals
AutonomousAgent
goalbase : Goal
motiveect : Motivation"Goal"Goal"
satisfy : Goal"
goals  goalbase
8 gs :  goalbase  satisfy gs = motiveect motivations goals gs
Therefore, satisfy
x
(gs) is the motivational eect on the autonomous agent x
of satisfying the goals, gs. We further dene the complement of a goal, which we
write goal , to be the goal to prevent that goal being achieved.
Consider the following situation in which, according to the model of some
autonomous agent y , the autonomous agent x is directly engaging the server
agent z for some goal g
x
so that:
(x ; z ; g
x
) 2 dengagement
and further suppose that agent y wants to use z for some other goal g
y
. There
are several possible courses of action for y .
{ y can persuade x to share z
{ y can persuade x to release z .
{ y can attempt to take z by force without x 's permission.
{ y can give x priority and nd an alternative.
Any decision as to which alternative to take requires an analysis of both
y 's motivations and x 's motivations. The analysis of their motivations below is
solely from y 's point of view.
{ satisfy
x
fg
y
; g
x
g > satisfy
x
fg
x
g. If g
y
and g
x
do not conict, it is possible for
z to adopt both of the goals of y and x without violating any motivational
constraints. So long as the motivational eect on x of satisfying both goals
is more than satisfying just her own, x will be disposed to share z .
{ satisfy
x
fg
y
g > satisfy
x
fg
x
g. y understands that x stands to gain more from
enabling y to satisfy y 's goal than from satisfying its own goal. This is due
to the eect that a positive change in y 's motivations will have on x . This
may require that y explains and persuades x of the degree of eect that g
y
will have. For example, a friend may currently be reading a book that I want
to borrow. My goal of borrowing the book may conict with my friends goal,
but because she wants to please me and does not need to read the book now,
she happily lends the book to me.
{ satisfy
y
fg
y
g > satisfy
y
fg
x
g. It may seem obvious that the motivational eect
on y of satisfying its goal should be greater than the motivational eect
on y of satisfying x 's goal. However, if x 's goal is not satised, then the
motivational eect on x will be negative, and this results in a state which
must be considered in terms of its eect on y . (In other words, a negative
motivational eect on y , particularly if it was a consequence of x , may result
in a negative motivational eect on x .) Thus this alternative may be chosen
if there is a positive motivational eect from y 's goal being satised, and
this is greater than the negative consequences of x 's goal not being satised.
Note that this relies on the relationship of y to x . Normally, y 's motivations
will be such that negative motivational eect on other agents will lead to
some negative motivational eect on y itself. If, however, y is motivated by
malicious concerns, then it is certainly possible that the consequences of x 's
goal not being satised may have a positive motivational eect on y . While
we do not envisage such a situation arising regularly, and though this is a
case typically not considered in related work, it ought to be possible within
any formalism. By using motivations in the way we describe, we allow the
possibility of perverse congurations leading to such malicious behaviour,
but envisage appropriate design of motivations so that this does not arise.
In summary, this captures normal social behaviour by which we act so as to
avoid annoying others, but allows for situations where we may deliberately
choose to annoy them. For example, if my friend is reading a book that I want
to borrow, then I can simply take the book from her without permission. It
only makes sense for me to do this, however, if the benet I get from having
the book is more signicant than the bad feeling caused in my friend by my
having taken it forcibly.
{ satisfy
y
fg
y
g < satisfy
y
fg
x
g. y understands that the motivational eect of
satisfying its goal will be less than the eect of causing a negative motiva-
tional eect on x through g
x
nor being satised. This aects y 's behaviour,
because its motivations are congured in such a way that y is concerned for
x . Like the previous case, this describes the situation where we do not act if
that action is likely to annoy others.
4.2 Applying Agent Models
Consider the situation in a library in which a user wants to locate a particular
book. The autonomous agents in the library world include the user and the
librarian. Now, suppose that in order to locate the book, the user requires the
assistance of the librarian. Since the librarian is autonomous, this means that the
user must persuade the librarian to cooperate with her in achieving her desired
goal. In attempting to locate the book for the user, the librarian uses a terminal
to invoke a computer program which, in turn, accesses the library databases and
performs the relevant query. These relationships can be captured very easily in
terms of the predicates dened earlier.
First, the librarian, L, cooperates with the user, U .
(L;U ) 2 cooperates
Then, the librarian uses the terminal, T , the program, P , and the database,
D , to locate the book.
(L;T ) 2 downs ^
(T ;P) 2 dengages ^
(P ;D) 2 dengages ^
) (L;D) 2 engages
In this scenario, the librarian owns (and also directly engages) the terminal,
T , and this engagement makes T a server-agent. In turn, T directly engages P ,
making it a server-agent, and similarly, P engages D . This engagement chain is
constructed through the engagement of agents by other agents in order to satisfy
the goal of locating the book, and is shown in Figure 2.
Let us now suppose that the terminal can only be used by one person at a
time, but the program and database can be used by many people at once. With
this information, other agents in the library can eectively decide what courses
of action to follow to achieve their aims. Another user, for example, U 2, may
also want to locate a book. U 2 must decide what action to take, or agents to
invoke, on the basis of the motivations of the autonomous agents involved in
the engagement. Since the terminal cannot be used by multiple agents and is
owned by the librarian, U 2 cannot share it, but can choose to take it forcibly,
to persuade L to release it, or to give L priority and either wait or nd an
alternative terminal. Note that this last possibility is not constrained by the
program and database being engaged by L, since they are not owned by L.
If U 2 attempts to take the terminal forcibly, the consequences may be severe
in terms of detrimental motivational eect on L. Persuading L to release the
terminal requires another cooperation, between L and U 2, which may not be
cooperates
dengages
dengages
engages
U
P
D
T
L
d_owns
Fig. 2. An Engagement Chain for the Library Scenario
forthcoming if the motivational eect of U 2's goal on L is less than L's current
goal. One of the alternative options is for U 2 to ask another librarian, L2, to
locate the book, while another solution would be for L2 to take part in separate
cooperations with U 2 and L so that the terminal is released for use in nding
the second book. This is because the negative motivational eect on L of not
cooperating with L2 will be signicantly greater than the negative motivational
eect of not cooperating with the user U 2.
Figure 3 shows another situation that arises when U 2 asks another librarian,
L2, to locate a book, and L2 uses a dierent terminal, T2. Note that in order
to avoid complicating the diagram, not all of the relations between the entities
are shown, though they can be inferred. For example, L engages T and P and
D , while L2 engages T2 and P and D .
cooperates
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cooperates
L2 U2
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Fig. 3. Additional Engagement and Cooperation in the Library Scenario
5 Related Work
This research shares some common themes with the concepts of dependence
networks [10]. Dependence networks use external descriptions which store in-
formation about other agents, comprising a set of goals, actions, resources and
plans. The goals are those an agent wants to achieve, the actions are those an
agent is able to perform, the resources are those over which an agent has control,
and the plans are those available to the agent, but using actions and resources
which are not necessarily owned by the agent. This means that one agent may
depend on another in terms of actions or resources in order to execute a plan.
Using external descriptions, the authors distinguish three dierent forms of
autonomy, as follows. An agent is a-autonomous if for a given goal, according
to a set of plans, there is some plan in the set which consists of only actions of
that agent. An agent is r-autonomous if, similarly, any resources needed belong
to the agent. An agent is s-autonomous if it is autonomous in both of the above
ways (and does not, therefore, need any help). If agents are not autonomous,
then they may depend, for resources or actions, on other agents. By contrast,
our work describes autonomy not as action or resource dependence, but as the
ability to make one's own choices, to generate goals. This is a far stronger notion
of autonomy. The fact that a pocket calculator has the resources and the actions
necessary for adding some numbers surely does not make it autonomous. A more
complete analysis of this work, and a reformulation of it in our framework can
be found in [3].
Moreover, even though this kind of categorisation is useful, it is not clear how
much help it would be to a motivated agent. An agent may believe that another
agent will perform a required action for reasons of continuing friendship, trust,
promise, and so on. The motivational context of these dependencies is what is
important, and the target agent may not care to investigate whether there are
any specic actions that it has promised to perform for an agent.
While our work has concentrated on dening the relationships that are in-
volved in cooperation, for example, other related work has addressed the pro-
cesses of cooperative problem solving, also in a formal way [15]. One possible
way forward might be to investigate the possibility of integrating these two ap-
proaches.
6 Conclusions and Further Work
The work reported in this paper is part of a broader project with the aim of
developing eective mechanisms for autonomous communication. To date, we
have developed a formal framework structuring the world into object, agent and
autonomous agent components. Based on those denitions, we are developing
mechanisms for goal generation and transfer or adoption so that agents may
interact with each other in useful ways. In particular, we describe and specify the
dierences that arise in these interactions which we characterise as engagements
of non-autonomous agents, and cooperation between autonomous agents. The
next objective is to incorporate explicit mechanisms for deliberation, which will
include both planning and communication. Our immediate aim is to provide a
communication facility through the use of knowledge interchange protocols [1].
Finally, we intend to add a learning component which will dynamically acquire
knowledge of the environment and of protocols so that more ecient behaviour
can be obtained.
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